Towards safer level crossings: existing recommendations, new applicable technologies and a proposed simulation model by Khoudour, Louahdi et al.
ORIGINAL PAPER
Towards safer level crossings: existing recommendations,
new applicable technologies and a proposed
simulation model
Louahdi Khoudour & Mohamed Ghazel &
Fouzia Boukour & Marc Heddebaut &
El-Miloudi El-Koursi
Received: 17 September 2008 /Accepted: 28 November 2008
# European Conference of Transport Research Institutes (ECTRI) 2008
Abstract Every year, more than 400 people are killed in over
1,200 accidents at road-rail level crossings in the European
Union. Together with tunnels and specific road black spots,
level crossings have been identified as being a particular weak
point in road infrastructure, seriously jeopardizing road safety.
In the case of railway transport, level crossings can represent as
much as 29% of all fatalities caused by railway operations. Up
to now, the only effective solution appears to involve upgrading
level crossing safety systems even though in more than 90% of
cases the primary accident cause is inadequate or improper
human behavior rather than any technical, rail-based issue. This
article provides results of research done on possible technolog-
ical solutions to reduce the number of accidents at level
crossings and demonstrate the effectiveness of the latter.
Elements of these recommendations and related research
activities constitute the main focus of the research work
described in this paper. It is organized as follows: In Section
2, we consider statistical data related to LX accidents in certain
given European countries. These statistics as well as a European
Commission Directive related to safety targets are analyzed and
the main trends are drawn. The study was carried out on the
basis of the classification by the European Railway Agency of
active LXs and passive LXs. These results form the foundation
for the work described in Section 3. Section 3 focuses on
advanced technology to improve LXs safety. Themain thrust of
the study is to evaluate low-cost, standard technology that can
contribute to a direct decrease in the number of accidents, at an
affordable cost. Existing surveillance technologies already used
in rail or road transport are first considered. To facilitate LX bi-
modality, special emphasis is put on technical solutions which
have already demonstrated high efficiency in both environ-
ments. In Section 4, the mode of operation of each potential
solution is modeled and evaluated considering several opera-
tional scenarii, in order to evaluate the aggregate benefits of all
the input. Setting models to describe the dynamics surrounding
the LX environment will prepare a basis to support the decision
making process of a joint rail and road sector strategy on how to
control LXs. Finally, section 5 brings the study to a close with a
list of the main areas in which to concentrate our future work.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the Coordination Action for the Sixth Framework
Programme “Safer European Level Crossing Appraisal and
Technology” (SELCAT) provided recommendations for
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further actions intended to improve safety at Level Cross-
ings, noted LX in the sequel. Considering existing input
from other projects as well as its own analysis, SELCAT’s
recommendations were developed around two major ideas:
(a) the use of advanced technological solutions designed to
minimise the impact of human factors as the main cause for
accidents at LXs and, (b) a joint rail and road sector
strategy to control and reduce risks at LXs.
Among the major high level recommendations provided by
this Coordination Action, one is to encourage society to
recognise the bi-modality of road/rail interface and work
closely with the road and rail sectors and all relevant
governmental agencies, to help reduce levels of risk from LXs.
Elements of these recommendations and related research
activities constitute the main focus of the research work
described in this paper. It is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we consider statistical data related to LX
accidents in certain given European countries. These
statistics, as well as a European Commission Directive
related to safety targets, are analyzed and the main trends
are drawn. The study was carried out on the basis of the
classification by the European Railway Agency of active
LXs and passive LXs (see definitions later). These results
form the foundation for the work described in Section 3.
Section 3 focuses on advanced technology to improve LXs
safety. The main thrust of the study is to evaluate low-cost,
standard technology that can contribute to a direct decrease
in the number of accidents, at an affordable cost. Existing
surveillance technologies already used in rail or road
transport are first considered. To facilitate LX bi-modality,
special emphasis is put on technical solutions which have
already demonstrated high efficiency in both environments.
Information drawn from previous on-site evaluations is also
provided. Advanced driver information systems are also
included in this Section 3. Use of fast, reliable, wireless
links to enable a seamless communication between the
vehicles, the LX, and the main control centre/s are analysed
in particular in the light of a recent European Commission’s
decision. In Section 4, the mode of operation of each
potential solution is modeled and evaluated considering
several operational scenarii, in order to evaluate the
aggregate benefits of all the inputs. Setting models to
describe the dynamics surrounding the LX environment
will prepare a basis to support the decision making process
of a joint rail and road sector strategy on how to control
LXs. Finally Section 5 brings the study to a close with a list
of the main areas in which to concentrate our future work.
2 Analysis of existing statistics
Safety at LX is only one part of a wider picture of transport
safety within the whole transport system. Governments, the
rail industry and road organizations have been implement-
ing a variety of countermeasures for many years to improve
railway LX safety. These actions are substantial and have
resulted in a continuing decrease in the number and the
severity of LX accidents. Every year, more than 400 people
die in accidents involving road vehicles at road–rail LXs in
the European Union [1]. Ninety percent of these fatalities
are linked to errors committed by road vehicles drivers.
LXs have been identified as being a particular weak point
in road infrastructure, seriously jeopardizing road safety.
This is a particular problem for Rail companies because
they cannot control the actions of road vehicle drivers and
pedestrians at LXs. The cost of railway accidents at LX is at
least 110 million euro per year in the EU (almost 1.200 LX
accidents per year between 2004 and 2006). LX accidents
are the shared responsibility of several transportation
players such as railways, road and local authorities, and
land use planning entities. Good cooperation between
railways and the road sector is a key point for managing
LXs’ safety. Table 1 shows that the majority of fatalities
involve Rolling Stock (RS) in motion (67%) and LXs
(29%). Therefore, RS in motion and LX encompass 96% of
fatalities. This demonstrates that, for the rail sector, LXs
represent the weak point in terms of accident risk. During
2004–2005, the number of fatalities in road accidents
registered in EU-25 is 85.000, caused by 2.573.100
accidents, which represents a fatality rate of 0.033
(85.000/2.573.100). The comparison for this same period
(2004–2005) of fatalities per accident in the railway sector
at LXs shows that 842 fatalities were caused by 2,917
accidents at LXs (source Eurostat) in EU-25 [1]. The
fatality rate per LX accident is 842/2,917=0.29.
This result demonstrates that the risk of a LX user dying
is ten times higher than that of a road user. Also to be noted
is that fatalities at LXs represent roughly 842/85.081=0.9%
of all fatalities in the road sector and 29% of all railway
accident fatalities. Hence, what is a significant risk to the
Table 1 Fatalities per class of accident in EU-25
Fatalities by type of
accident (2004–2005)
Accidents caused
by RS in Motion
Accident
at LX
Others Collisions Derailments Fires on
board
Total
No of accidents 3,644 2,917 5,853 1,294 1,202 271 15,181
No of fatalities 1,976 842 68 61 8 1 2,956
Percentage 67 29 2 2 0 0 100
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safe operation of the rail network is in fact only a small
element of the overall road safety issue (Table 2).
Up to now, the only effective solution appears to have been
to upgrade LX safety systems [2] even though in over 90% of
the cases, the primary accident cause seems to stem from
inadequate human behavior rather than any technical, rail-
based issue. Human causes from roadside include all
intentional and non-intentional road vehicle driver errors;
zig-zagging, warning light violation due to inattention, sun
shine or perception of waiting time. The standards set by the
European railway sector involve high safety requirements for
LX systems which represent a substantial cost which in turn
hinders the technological upgrade of existing systems.
Railway standards already include a definition of safety risk.
It is based on a classification of risks ranging from low to
high, and according to which unacceptable levels of risk must
be eliminated by the technical system. Nevertheless, the lack
of an approved common safety methodology which would
allow the industry to quantify the risk to be reduced still leads
to the imposition of the highest safety integrity levels for
technical solutions in most European countries.
In 2004, the European Commission produced Railway
Safety Directive 49/2004/EC [3], in order to define Common
Safety Targets (CSTs) and to improve, where possible,
system safety levels. The Directive stipulates that Member
States are duty-bound to conduct an independent investiga-
tion in order to improve rail safety and prevent accidents. In
addition to serious accidents, the investigating body may
conduct investigations into accidents and incidents which,
under slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in
more serious accidents, including technical failures in
structural rail sub-sections or interoperability components
of the trans-European high-speed or conventional rail
systems. The Railway Safety Directive 49/2004/EC requires
the safety of railway transport to be defined according to
acceptable individual risks to LX users (Article 7, §4a) [3].
The Directive expects the development of procedures and
methods for risk evaluation and assessment (Article 6, §3a).
The CSTs define safety levels that must at least be reached in
each Member State by different parts of the railway system
and by the system as a whole. These CSTs are expressed as
risk acceptance criteria for individual risks (passengers,
maintenance staff including subcontractors, LX users and
others, and unauthorized persons) and societal risks.
ERA (European Railway Agency) classified LXs into two
groups: active LXs (group A) and passive LXs (group B)
(Fig. 1).
The simplest description for passive type LXs may be all
LXs equipped with any warning signs, plates, devices, or
any other protection equipment, which is permanent and
independent of any traffic situation. The first analysis of
operational LX risk was carried out on the basis of the
active and passive LX types as defined per the European
Railway Agency for the purpose of defining Common
Table 2 2004–2005 data on the rail–road interface
Transport
mode
(A) (B) (C) = (A)/(B) %
N° fatalities
at LXs
Total
fatalities
Road 842 85.081 0.9
Railways 2,956 29
Fig. 1 LX types classified by
ERA
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Safety Indicators [3]. It defines an active LX as a LX where
the crossing users are protected from, or warned of, the
approaching train by the activation of devices when it is
unsafe for the user to cross the LX. In the case of an
automatic active LX (A.1 in Fig. 1), these devices are
activated by the approaching train. Manual active LXs
(A.2) are activated by humans when there is no railway
signal interlocked with control train movements. In the case
of passive LX (B in Fig. 1) there is no warning system and/
or protection system showing when it is unsafe for the user
to cross the LX. SELCAT project [2, 4] carried out an
analysis of accident statistics by comparing operational risk
according to the different LX types. As a basis for
comparison, seven basic LX types as defined per ERA
were taken into account. The individual risk for road LX
user was compared as per the different LX types [5].
As basis for operational risk comparison, the seven level
crossing types defined by ERA have been taken. However,
only five of these types could be identified (the A1.1 and
A2.2 were not clearly identified) when analyzing the 66
collected national level crossing types of countries involved
in SELCAT project [4, 6]. Figure 2 shows this comparison
whereby the height of each column corresponds to the
individual risk considering the accidents (Acc), fatalities
(Fat) or injuries (In) at LX of a particular type.
A comparison of LX operational risk in the EU countries
analyzed using the process of normalization by vehicle
interaction, is shown in Fig. 2. It is immediately clear that
the operational risk of LXs in Eastern European Countries
represented is significantly higher than the one in Western
European Member States.
In Fig. 2, one can notice that the highest risk, for the
European countries involved in SELCAT, applies to LXs with
warning lights (A 1.2), followed by the automatic LX with
warning lights and barriers (A 1.3) [2]. Therefore, the main
conclusions drawn from the statistics analysis are as follows:
– Safety at LXs is a definite problem for rail companies
as they have no control over actions of road vehicle
drivers and pedestrians at LXs and as it represents 29%
of total accidents in a rail system compared to the road
sector which represents 0.9% of total accidents.
Clearly, while LXs represent a significant risk area for
the safe operation of a rail network, this is in fact only a
small element of the overall road safety issue.
– The highest operational risk in Europe is attributed to
automatic LXs fitted with warning lights but without
barriers. The second highest risk is attributed to
automatic LXs with warning lights and with barriers.
– The results of investigations into causes of LX
accidents have identified inappropriate or inadequate
human behaviour as the main source of the problem.
Human factors play an important role for both the road
and the rail. Violations of traffic regulations, disregard
of warning signals, and trespassing by road vehicle
drivers and pedestrians contribute to most of the
fatalities. In terms of rail, staff with safety related
responsibilities (i.e. manually operated LXs, warnings
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given by train drivers, supervision, and fall back
operations) are particularly vulnerable to human errors.
Therefore, design of new technological solutions
intended to minimise the impact of human behaviour
ought to be based on an analysis of human factors in
the context of limiting safety risks at LXs. Such an
approach is expected to produce a twofold benefit: it
will help increase people’s awareness of risk at LXs
and it will minimise the impact of intentional and
unintentional hazardous human behaviour. The solution
suggested at the end of this article will consider the
highest operational risk at automatic LXs with warning
devices and half barriers. This solution can be applied
to other LX types.
3 Possible solutions using advanced technology
to improve LX safety
The main focus of this section is to suggest solutions
applicable to the following areas:
– technological improvements of the LX safety infra-
structure, such as deployment of various types of
sensors (audio, video, radar, laser) for timely detection
of potentially hazardous situations;
– use of fast, reliable, wireless links to enable seamless
communication between train, car drivers, LX and a
main control center.
3.1 Current technologies used for object detection
Most LXs are fitted with high performing equipment such
as red lights, automatic full/half barriers, notices. However,
such equipments are unable to prevent or to detect
dangerous behaviors. Nowadays, most collisions occurring
at road–rail interfaces are due to vehicle drivers not seeing a
train coming or believing that they still have enough time to
cross. That is why clearly identifying whether or not
vehicles/pedestrians are trapped on the tracks and inside
the barriers and efficiently using this information may
reduce the risk of collisions between trains and vehicles/
pedestrians. Obstacle detection systems appear as a break-
through solution to improve LX safety and lower the
number of fatalities.
3.1.1 Current technologies used for object detection
The detection of vehicles, pedestrians or other obstacles
approaching a LX requires the setting up of detectors.
Several technologies provide this, such as optical or sonic
sensors, inductive loops, radars and video imaging.
The choice of the appropriate detector depends strongly
on external factors, e.g. environmental conditions or the
size of the object to detect.
A study was led by RSSB [7], the Rail Safety and
Standard Board—a UK company which aims at providing
knowledge, analysis and a substantial level of technical
expertise, and powerful information and risk management
tools—researching into obstacle detection at LXs. On the
basis of this study, obstacle detectors can be divided into
two major categories: conventional and advanced.
Conventional obstacle detection has been used to
prevent crashes between trains and vehicles (optical beam,
sonic detection, inductive loop) [8, 9]. Obstacle detection
systems using advanced methods are constituted by Radar
Method [8, 9] and video imaging [10, 11].
3.1.2 Detection with video imaging
This section is mainly concerned with the timely detection
of events that could jeopardize personal safety of individ-
uals, groups, cars, as well as other related incidents that
could adversely impact upon the quality of service for LXs.
All operators, passenger groups and staff representatives
have in-depth knowledge of such events and where they are
likely to occur. The main purpose of the tools is, clearly, to
detect such untimely events when they are happening. For
illustration purposes, a non-exhaustive list of possible
events to detect includes: Car parked on the tracks, objects
left on the tracks, trespassing, pedestrians crossing the LX.
The main aim of the use of video imaging is to develop
cost-effective and integrated technical solutions that can
sustain the deployment of pro-active monitoring procedures
on a railway network. For this purpose, an in situ
experimentation was carried out at a LX. Several scenarii
representing events of interest were played by actors; they
created mainly potentially dangerous situations at LXs. The
scenarii played by these actors stemmed from real situations
which had occurred and had lead to accidents. The system
developed and tested on this occasion was able to detect in
real-time each element interfering in the operation of a LX:
trains, cars, motorcycles, bicycles, pedestrians, and any
other object. For this first experimentation, an architecture
composed of two cameras was set up, one for the detection
of the on-coming train and the other for the monitoring of
the LX’s central section. CCTV (Close Circuit Television)
at LXs could indeed be used in the following methods:
– Off-line use: the primary function of a perception
system using optical sensors consists in the observa-
tion. The passive LX analysis leads to the production of
statistics related to the use of the LX, road user
behavior in terms of speed, inter-distances, by auto-
matically detecting and identifying abnormal behaviors
Eur. Transp. Res. Rev.
thanks to indexing on to the video. This also allows the
various entities supervising the LX to have quick
access to a video sequence which helps to have a
better understanding of behaviors leading to dangerous
situations. This method allows access to information
made available by these systems.
– Online use: here, the objective is to use the perception
system tools in the surroundings of the LX to recognize
potentially dangerous situations such as the presence or
approach of objects (pedestrians, motor-cycles,
vehicles or other obstacles) which could get in the
way. The objective of this method consists in detecting
and anticipating a critical situation.
Online use allows real-time detection of all components
involved at the LX, and an analysis of their interaction. In
addition, it becomes possible to classify such elements with
reference to their nature and behavior, in conjunction with
the functional model of the LX [12, 13].
The experimentation lasted several days so that we could
simulate some one hundred scenarii. They were inspired
from scenarii drawn from real accident analyses. The
accuracy of the algorithm was tested and compared findings
collected in situ. Accuracy of tested events was around
99.3% with a processing time of 25 frames per second.
We observe here that we are able to detect with good
accuracy a classic example of potentially dangerous
situations which often lead to serious accidents. These
situations must be communicated and shared with the other
actors involved around the LX (Train driver, control centre,
car drivers). A specifically adapted communication tool is
necessary to ensure the correct type of transmission of
information. This point is developed in the next section.
3.2 LX advanced information system
Communications are vital for seamless and safe railway
operations. They are also becoming vital on the road side
with many different concerned users. To illustrate the
problem, at Britain’s level crossings, between January and
September 2008 there were nearly 900 incidents involving
a vehicle. Pedestrians too are running the risk with over 200
near misses this year. Thus, pedestrians, cyclists and
vehicles can most likely beneficiate of an infrastructure-
based advanced information system improving the existing
warning lights. These figures show also that vehicle drivers
are very much concerned and that an advanced driver
information system delivering warning information inside
the vehicles can most likely increase safety at LX. This
section will now concentrate on this category of road users.
The goal of this section is to compare current situations
regarding wireless communications in railway and road
operations, i.e. Communication Based Train Control
(CBTC) and Car to Infrastructure (C2I) communications.
As far as railways are concerned, CBTC Systems, also
known as Positive Train Control (PTC) systems, provide
positive train separation, speed enforcement, and road
worker protection utilizing wireless communications to
exchange control information. As far as roads are
concerned, based on WLAN communications, VANETs—
the Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks could provide a broad-
casting facility between vehicles within radio line of sight,
to broadcast real time information on traffic, and road
conditions and hazards. At rail–road crossings, these
wireless communication systems could therefore be used
to reduce road–rail intersection collisions by transmitting
train movement information to road users.
3.2.1 Train wireless communication system
The railway wireless communication systems resort more
and more to the use of existing off the shelf products
designed by the telecom industry, upgraded if necessary. By
using such an approach, the railway industry can take full
advantage of the R&D investments of the telecom industry.
The railway industry would also benefit from any evolu-
tions in telecommunication standards.
Table 3 lists some different wireless technologies used or
tested for railway communications.
In Table 3, the two first lines consider WLAN (Wireless
Local Area Network) and WMAN (Wireless Metropolitan
Area Network) systems. In line 1, IEEE 802.11 represents
the WLAN (Wireless Fidelity Wi-Fi). Wi-Fi systems are
now rolled out on board many trains to support wireless
passenger services. They are also a CBTC solution widely
used for train to wayside communication in subway
systems. IEEE is performing a standardization work on
CBTC, and IEEE RTVISC-1473 considers the different
train-wayside communication solutions provided by train
control suppliers. WLAN communications are among these
existing technologies [14, 15]. The satellite communica-
tions which have been included here since railway
operators are now considering them [16–18]. Satellite
communications are also now commercially used for
providing Internet up to trains, with data relayed inside
the trains, using Wi-Fi [18]. Finally, Table 3 mentions the
GSM-R, the “Global System for Mobile Communication
for Railways”, the digital cellular system standardized in
order to harmonize train to ground radio systems for
control/command on board trans-European trains. GSM-R
is typical of a telecommunication industry development
upgraded to fulfill the railway CBTC requirements [19].
So, if we consider a train passing through a LX at a
maximum speed of 160 kph, a conventional train with 15
wagons would need approximately 900 m to stop. Then,
starting from this 1 km communication range order of
Eur. Transp. Res. Rev.
magnitude and using the information in Table 3, we can
select the best candidates to support an effective LX track-
to-train advanced information system. Loading a continu-
ous coverage communication system with the only locally
LX significant information would be ineffective. Thus,
GSM-R and satellite communication are not feasible.
WiMAX would provide more range than necessary. WLAN
with two or three consecutive repeaters and corresponding
hops would provide the necessary communication range.
For our LX application, in addition to train communication,
a reliable, safe and high data communication link for car-to-
car (C2C) and C2I is also required. Therefore, in this
section we will also evaluate the potential of this WLAN
technology for road applications. The recent European
Commission decision providing a single EU-wide 30 MHz
frequency band that can be used for road safety applications
will be presented and analyzed as well as results from
simulations for a short range radio C2C communication
system. This recent Commission Decision paves the way
for a possible mandatory C2C and C2I wireless communi-
cation system to be installed in all road vehicles circulating
in Europe, in several years.
3.2.2 Car wireless driver information system
As stated before, in a CBTC system, the railway Local
Control Centre and the Main control Centre are
interconnected by bi-directional data communication links
which may be wired or wireless. This is not the usual
situation yet on road sides where only lateral visual
signaling exists, and there is no distant repetition of the
LX signaling information inside road vehicles. This
situation could evolve in a near future. In fact, improving
traffic efficiency, reducing congestion on roads and reduc-
ing accidents as well as damage cost are challenging tasks
in most regions of the World. To put the problem into
context, annual damage cost caused by accidents in the EU
alone is approximately 100 Billion euro. This can be
potentially minimized by using new information and
communication technologies. Among these technologies,
C2C and C2I communications are good candidates to
improve the current situation. In this way, connecting
vehicles to each other or to infrastructure by a wireless
radio link opens the way for a new range of applications
and upgrades of existing applications [20, 21]. Moreover,
the C2I communications can send data to distant additional
signaling panels for other road users (pedestrians,
cyclists,...). Recently, new spectrum requirements,
corresponding to new C2C and C2I communication
requirements have been discussed within several European
agencies. The European Conference of Postal and Tele-
communications Administrations (CEPT) approved the
spectrum requirements for road safety and traffic efficientTa
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Intelligent Transport System (ITS) applications as articulat-
ed by the industry. On August 5th, 2008, the Commission
published a Decision providing a single EU-wide 30 MHz
frequency band to be used for immediate and reliable C2C,
and C2I [22]. Figure 3 presents such a typical C2I–C2C
communication scenario of the propagation of an alerting
message.
As mentioned before, in over 90% of cases, the primary
cause of accident at LXs appears to be inadequate or
improper human behavior rather than any technical, rail
based issue. Thus, any advanced driver information system
such as the Vehicular ad-hoc Network (VANET) offers the
potential to reduce road–rail intersection collisions by
communicating information on train movements to road
vehicles.
C2I communications on a centimeter-wave length are
expected to be using unidirectional and semi directional
antennae broadcasting on a horizontal plane and concen-
trating energy at low angles over the road surface. Vehicles
use relatively low, close to the ground, antennae and a
typical antenna height above the surface of the road is
approx. 1.7 m. In Europe, a constant 23 dBm/MHz
Equivalent Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) over the whole
bandwidth, is currently envisaged to provide an expected
useful range of several hundred meters. To simulate
transmission from a LX to a vehicle, a propagation model
was used. The model considered signals reflecting off the
ground [23, 24]. The LX communication system antenna
height was set at 5 m and the receiving antenna height was
set to 1.7 m. Using a 10 MHz band channel, transmitter
power was set to 33 dBm. To achieve the requested C2C C2I
6–7 Mbps bit rate, considered sufficient for vehicle to
infrastructure communication [22], a −72 dBm reference
input power level was considered as a receiving threshold.
Figure 4 represents the simulation results obtained using
these parameters and this −72 dBm reference input power.
Considering the results in Fig. 4, we obtain a commu-
nication range in excess of 500 m. Fading heavily affects
communication over the first 100 m. Received signals drop
several times below the −72 dBm selected reference level.
3.2.3 Conclusion
The type of LX to vehicle wireless communication
described above could therefore provide vehicles with the
duplication of the LX status information across a significant
transmission range. This would mean that the driver of a
vehicle driving at an average speed of 60 kph would receive
warning information 30 s before arriving at the LX. This
definitely broadens the warning triangle obtained from
direct visual information, which is often situated 150 m
ahead of the LX in a rural environment and 50 m ahead in
an urban environment. For other road users (pedestrians,
cyclists, etc), several warning techniques can be used in
order to provide the same signalling information. Moreover,
wireless communication also offers better flexibility in
terms of the content of the information sent to drivers. As
seen in Fig. 4, LX information status can be relayed by
intermediary vehicles to increase this 500 m communica-
tion range further. However other studies still have to be
done in order to determine which advance delay time
proves most effective when conveying this information to
drivers.
4 Static and dynamic specification of the proposed
system
4.1 Architecture
What we propose here is a static point of view of the
system. UML1 diagrams will be used to illustrate the
different points of view. The deployment diagram presented
in Fig. 5 gives a description of the architecture while
indicating the physical position of the system’s components
and their distribution. In this diagram, the communication
links between the “modules” are also shown. All of the
transmission means are not shown in this diagram and we
use module links to represent communications. For in-
stance, the train detection system may alert the LX local
protection system through a connection which could be
either wired or wireless as in the system proposed in [25].
For the sake of clarity, we have included in our model certain
external entities which interact with our system. In Fig. 5,
these entities correspond to what is outside the dotted line.
The global architecture of the system shows three main
modules. The first one is the « Train sensing system » which
serves to detect train arrivals and departures respectively
toward/from the LX. This module is responsible for triggering
the local protection system composed of automatic half
barriers and signalling lights. The second module is also
linked to a monitoring system (third module) composed of
cameras, a processing unit responsible for the analysis of
image sequences sent by the cameras—and possibly for
storing them in a dedicated database—. The unit also
recognises potentially dangerous situations and alerts the
Local Control Centre (LCC) of the LX zone. The LCC is able
to communicate with the approaching train in order for
example to issue a braking order. The LCC is also linked to a
Main remote Control Centre (MCC) which manages the
traffic on a larger scale. Following a disruption occurring on at
a LX, a MCCmay decide to divert some trains to other routes.
Note that train detection devices have to be situated far enough
away from the LX crossing zone, so that when obstacles are
1 UML: Unified Modeling Language
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detected within this zone, there still is enough time for the
monitoring module to take anticipatory measures.
4.2 Example of operational scenario
In this section, we focus on the dynamic point of view. We
will show some operational scenarios [26, 27] of the system
using UML dynamic diagrams. Here a sequence diagram is
elaborated (cf. Fig. 6) in such a way as to bring out the
interaction between the system modules.
In Fig. 6, the following sequence of events is presented:
– Cameras send image sequences to the obstacle detec-
tion module (ODM)
– ODM checks situation while processing sequences sent
by cameras
– a potentially dangerous situation is diagnosed
– alert is sent to LCC which assesses situation at the LX
and alerts approaching train, which in turn starts
braking
– LCC gives order to ODM to close LX to traffic
– ODM sends a closing order to local protection system
(PS) which starts closing cycle
– ODM alerts to cars in the neighbourhood
– according to type of disruption, LCC can alert main
control centre, which then takes the suitable decision in
terms of traffic management.
The scenario presented above demonstrates the capacity
for anticipation of the system; in this case, closing the LX
early and alerting all approaching cars avoids compounding
complications at the LX.
In the system presented above, image processing
techniques are used in order to detect potentially dangerous
situations at the LX. Let us note that the system will be
enriched by other devices able to enhance global efficiency.
This is one of the main aims of the PANsafer research
project that the INRETS institute will lead with some other
industrial and institutional partners. In a more complex
system, several kinds of information will be generated. All
this information has to be gathered, interpreted before the
decision making process. A global model which depicts
data handling and describes the operation of this new
system in various situations will be drawn up.
5 Conclusion
The work described in this paper has addressed possible
technological solutions to improve level crossing safety. A
new generation of level crossing fitted with equipment was
described, made up of three main parts: sensing, commu-
nication and LX modeling. A case study was presented with
the aim to explore the potential of automatic detection
technologies using intelligent cameras in level crossing safety
applications. The conclusion has been that the detection of
stopped vehicles provides part of the solution to the problem
of safety at level crossings. However, further tests of and
improvements to the video system are needed. These include:
testing on a larger video data set, increasing robustness in
terms of shadow and headlight detection in order to limit the
number of false detection incidents, improving the reliability
of the system in adverse weather conditions.
In addition, a transmission system is provided in order to
transmit the status of the system as well as updates to the
relevant decision making centres. It also provides triggers
and signals for alarms in potentially dangerous situations,
or in case of a system failure. With respect to the case study
presented earlier, the transmission system presented in this
paper is needed to deal with video sequences which
generally require high transmission bandwidth.
The functional models developed for the assessment of
technological change are elaborated with information on
Fig. 3 Typical advanced driver information scenario (European
Telecommunication Scientific Institute (ETSI))
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Fig. 4 Received power at 5.9 GHz, along the LX to vehicle radio link
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timing in order to understand the interaction between the
different functions. Next, the modelling carried out has to
address dependability, safety, reliability and availability of
the components of the level crossing, and the effects on
these parameters when new technology is introduced. In
order to calculate the risks of failure and therefore the
impact on failure risk when new technology is introduced,
it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive physical
decomposition of the system under analysis.
Further work is planned for the near future. Some of
them will be developed within the framework of PANsafer
Project, a French national work-programme. Among the
goals of this project, we can list:
analysis of user behaviour and the behaviour linked to
the infrastructure and its mode of operation, sensing
and detecting automatically and faultlessly all poten-
tially dangerous situations at level crossings, exploring
new technologies and mastering evaluation techniques
in order to optimise communication around the level
crossing, integration and validation on a full scale test
site of all the concepts developed.
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